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 SUMMARY 
This paper sets out to compare some 
aspects of the transition packages in two 
seemingly incomparable countries, in 
search of similarities and dissimilarities, 
and hints as to where Bosnia and Her-
zegovina may have gone wrong. Particu-
lar attention is paid to the macroeco-
nomics part of the transition package, 
together with assessment of privatization 
and the role of FDI. The institutional as-
pect of the transition, particularly in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, is treated in the 
second part. 
Hungary, seen here as a success 
story of transition, joined the EU on May 
1, 2004. However, any similarity that 
Hungary’s transition policy and measures 
appears to have to the Washington Con-
sensus will not bear more than cursory 
scrutiny. Privatization was conducted un-
der wise government policy. Foreign-trade 
policy and foreign-trade liberalization 
formed a gradual, well-executed process. 
Hungary used exchange-rate policy to 
support the competitiveness of domestic 
and transnational corporations on the 
world market. Wage and income policy 
were supportive to economic growth and 
driven by productivity considerations. 
Monetary policy was also designed to 
back economic growth and inflation was 
successfully brought under control. The 
necessary political consensus was present 
in Hungary and due attention was given 
to institution and capacity building. Thus 
Hungary’s transition policy seems to have 
been more Keynesian than free-market 
driven  
The transition package in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is entirely free-market 
driven. The state has been excluded 
from the economy on ideological 
grounds, though a ‘normally’ organized 
state still has not arisen. Under such 
conditions, a full protectorate might have 
been more efficient. For Bosnia and Her-
zegovina is a semi-protectorate. The 
country is devoid of macroeconomic 
management except for the currency 
board. Voucher privatization has been 
performed along entity lines, according 
to ethnic considerations. The loss of large 
foreign markets was of great importance 
both to Hungary and to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Hungary lost the COMECON 
market, while Bosnia and Herzegovina 
lost that of former Yugoslavia. Still 
worse, Bosnia and Herzegovina lost its 
part in the division of labour within the 
Yugoslav market. Then came the 1992–5 
war. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s starting 
position for transition was incomparably 
more difficult and complicated than 
Hungary’s. It called for a more cautious 
solution than the one offered by the in-
ternational community, and a more sup-
ply side-oriented economic concept than 
Hungary’s. Despite all that, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has been practising the 
Washington Consensus in the fullest 
sense, which Hungary did not. 
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INTRODUCTION* 
Hungary, which became a member of 
the EU in May 2004, 15 years after the 
fall of the Berlin wall, is usually re-
garded as one of the most successful 
transition economies. At first glance, it 
seems that the ‘Washington Consensus’ 
has been vindicated by Hungary’s case. 
FDI, especially investment by transnation-
als, contributed to Hungary’s success. 
The government wisely refrained from 
much interference in day-to-day business 
affairs, thereby creating a favourable 
business climate. M. Porter’s diamond 
seems to have been the building block of 
Hungarian competitiveness, though the 
diamond is surmounted by transnational, 
not Hungarian corporations. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, 
is a theoretical case of failure in transi-
tion, despite 100 per cent acceptance of 
the ‘Washington Consensus’, whose free-
market ideology (even theology) with a 
promising role for SMEs and privatiza-
tion, coupled with an expected inflow of 
FDI, were to provide basis of transition 
success. Unfortunately, in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina transition turned out to be 
more of a failure than a success. It was 
faced with a 40 per cent unemployment 
rate in mid-2004, according to official 
statistics. A resolution recently adopted 
by Parliament sets its sights on achieving 
70 per cent of the GDP for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1991. Some 50–60 per 
cent of students and young people say 
they want to leave Bosnia and Herzego-
vina for good. 
                                                 
* The author was a guest at the Institute for 
World Economics at the Hungarian Academy of 
Science in April and May 2004 and wishes to 
express gratitude to the Institute, particularly to 
Director András Inotai, Tamás Novák and Éva 
Nagy for warm hospitality during his stay in 
Budapest. 
This paper sets out to compare 
some aspects of the transition packages 
in two seemingly incomparable countries, 
in search of similarities and dissimilari-
ties, and hints as to where Bosnia and 
Herzegovina may have gone wrong. Par-
ticular attention is paid to the macroeco-
nomics part of the transition package, 
together with assessment of privatization 
and the role of FDI. The institutional as-
pect of the transition, particularly in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, is treated in the 
second part. 
Hungary’s future is well known, 
but that of Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
less easy to predict, economically or po-
litically. The paper attempts to tackle the 
issue of the country’s past and future in 
a seemingly unique way. 
1) SOME ASPECTS OF HUNGARY’S 
TRANSITION
1 
Hungary’s economic performance im-
proved dramatically in the second half of 
the 1990s after strong stabilization 
measures and deep structural reforms. 
During this period, it was able to switch 
from economic stagnation to strong 
growth, while dramatically improving its 
external accounts. Hungary today is re-
garded as a top performer among the 
transition countries. It became a full 
member of the European Union on May 
1, 2004. 
The challenge now is to consolidate 
its stabilization gains and finalize its 
structural reforms, to make the recovery 
sustainable in the longer term. These ob-
jectives are well within the focus of 
Hungary’s policymakers. In the macro-
economic field, they need to ensure that 
the investment expansion, which has been 
driving the economic recovery and build-
                                                 
1 This part of the paper is based on World 
Bank (1999). 
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ing up future potential, is not inter-
rupted by re-emergence of external im-
balances, due to a less favourable envi-
ronment or excessive government and 
private consumption. 
1.1. Stabilization and recovery in 
the later 1990s 
Hungary, like all Eastern European tran-
sition economies, experienced deep reces-
sion early in its transition – a 20 per 
cent drop in GDP between 1990 and 
1993 – due primarily to a collapse of its 
COMECON exports resulting, among other 
things, from price and trade liberaliza-
tion and subsidy reductions. Like most 
other countries affected, Hungary began 
to pull out of the recession in 1993–4,2 
but while the others managed to consoli-
date their recovery in subsequent years, 
Hungary experienced a sharp slowdown 
in economic activity. In mid-decade, in 
1995 and 1996, Hungary appeared to 
have the poorest macroeconomic per-
formance of any Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) country, marked by the 
                                                 
2 Ibid., p. 20. 
highest inflation rates and the lowest 
rates of growth in output.  
The recovery in Hungary’s output 
was delayed by the emergence of ex-
tremely severe external imbalances, ex-
emplified by current-account deficits of 
almost 10 per cent of GDP in 1993 and 
1994 and a marked increase in foreign 
debt. These were caused primarily by 
fiscal imbalances of the same order of 
magnitude (Table 1), although real ap-
preciation of the forint and other factors 
also contributed. The country suffered a 
sharp loss in creditworthiness, caused 
also by the perception that privatization 
and other important structural reforms 
had stalled. By early 1995, Hungary was 
paying very high spreads on its external 
borrowing (over 500 basis points above 
LIBOR). 
1.2. Stabilization and acceleration 
of structural reforms in 
mid-decade 
Faced with the prospect of a balance-of-
payments crisis, the government 
introduced in March 1995 a 
drastic stabilization programme 
that also accelerating the struc-
tural reforms initiated in the early 
1990s. The programme included 
sharp fiscal adjustment: 9 per 
cent devaluation of the forint fol-
lowed by pre-announced crawling 
peg and very rigid wage policy. 
The extent of the fiscal support is 
shown by the sharp decline in the 
general deficit – from 8.4 per 
cent of GDP in 1994 to 3 per 
cent in 1996 (excluding privatiza-
tion revenues). This was made 
possible by an impressive reduc-
tion in fiscal expenditures – by 
10 per cent of GDP in the same 
period (Table 2). 
Table 1 
Inflation and growth in selected CEE countries, 
1993–1999 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Inflation (average CPI, per cent per annum) 
Hungary 22.5 18.8 28.2 23.6 18.3 14.3 9.0
Czech Republic 20.8 10.1 9.1 8.8 8.5 10.7 2.2
Poland 35.3 32.2 27.8 19.9 14.8 11.8 6.8
Slovakia 23.2 13.4 9.9 5.8 6.2 6.7 11.5
Slovenia 32.9 21.0 13.5 9.9 8.4 7.9 8.0
Real GDP growth (per cent per annum) 
Hungary -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 5.1 4.0
Czech Republic 0.6 2.7 6.4 3.9 1.0 -2.7 -1.0
Poland 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.1 6.9 4.8 4.0
Slovakia -3.7 4.9 6.9 6.6 6.5 4.4 1.5
Slovenia 2.8 5.3 4.1 3.1 3.8 3.9 3.8
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1.3. Sustainable growth 
Fiscal management has remained prudent 
in recent years. While there was some 
loosening of fiscal policy in 1997 and 
1998, as indicated by a decline in the 
primary surplus and an increase in the 
overall deficit, this was less than it might 
appear. The worsening of fiscal indica-
tors reflects in part absorption of the 
quasi-fiscal deficit of the National Bank 
of Hungary – this central-bank deficit 
had existed without being explicitly com-
puted – and revenue losses from pension 
reform, which were neutral in terms of 
national savings. 
The 9 per cent devaluation of the 
forint provided an initial gain in com-
petitiveness, although it contributed to a 
temporary increase in 
inflation. The initial 
devaluation was fol-
lowed, however, by 
pre-announced, declin-
ing monthly devalua-
tions of the forint vis-
à-vis a currency bas-
ket, which placed in-
flation firmly on a 
downward path. Fi-
nally, the use of wage 
policy as an instru-
ment of stabilization 
appears in a sharp 
decline in real gross 
wages in 1995 and 
1996 by 9 and 3 per 
cent, respectively. The 
low increase in nomi-
nal wages provided a 
second nominal anchor 
and improved corpo-
rate profitability and 
competitiveness, creat-
ing conditions for 
subsequent expansion 
of investment and ex-
ports. 
The stabilization package of March 
1995 was accompanied by an impressive 
acceleration in structural reforms. Over 
the 1995–8 period, Hungary implemented 
a comprehensive programme of corpo-
rate and banking reforms that included 
privatizing major utilities and restructur-
ing and privatization of all the major 
banks. Hungary was also the first CEE 
country to implement a systematic pen-
sion reform, involving reforms to the 
public pay-as-you-go scheme and the in-
troduction of a fully funded private pil-
lar. These and other reforms restored 
the country’s image as a pioneer in 
structural reforms among the transition 
countries, generating a surge in the vol-
ume of FDI and heightening the pros-
pects for major efficiency gains. 
Table 2
Selected economic indicators for Hungary, 1993–1998 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Real sector: % change 
Real GDP  -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 5.1 
Exports of goods/services (real) -10.1 13.7 13.4 7.4 26.4 16.3 
Imports of goods/services (real) 20.2 8.8 -0.7 5.7 25.5 22.5 
Fixed investment (real) 2.0 12.5 -4.3 6.7 9.2 11.4 
Private consumption (real) 1.9 -0.2 -7.1 -2.7 1.7 3.8 
Average CPI 22.5 18.8 28.2 23.6 18.3 14.3 
Gross wage growth (real) -0.5 5.1 -8.9 -2.6 3.4 4.4 
Real effective exchange rate(unit 
labour cost) 4.3 7.3 19.4 8.6 2.7 8.5 
Unemployment rate (end period) 12.6 10.9 10.9 10.7 10.4 9.1 
Real sector: % of GDP 
Exports of goods and services 26.4 28.9 37.3 38.9 45.5 49.8 
Imports of goods and services 34.6 35.4 38.5 39.9 46.0 52.3 
Fixed investment 18.9 20.1 20.0 21.4 22.1 23.2 
General government       
Overall balance (excl. privatization) -6.6 -8.4 -6.4 -3.0 -4.8 -4.7 
Overall balance (incl. privatization) -6.0 -7.5 -3.2 0.8 -1.8 -4.4 
Primary balance (excl. privatization) -2.7 -2.2 2.2 3.7 2.7 1.6 
Expenditures 60.8 60.4 54.3 49.0 49.2 47.1 
Public debt 90.4 88.2 86.4 72.8 63.9 60.2 
External accounts       
Trade balance -8.4 -8.8 -5.5 -5.9 -3.8 -4.4 
Current-account balance -9.0 -9.5 -5.3 -3.7 -2.1 -4.8 
Foreign direct investment 6.0 2.8 10.0 4.4 3.6 3.0 
Gross external debt 63.7 68.4 70.9 61.0 51.9 56.3 
Net external debt 38.7 45.4 36.6 31.4 24.4 26.0 
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1.4. Impressive performance in 
the second half of the 1990s 
The programme of stabilization and 
structural reforms initiated in 1995 had 
impressive results. As Table 2 shows, the 
combination of the pre-announced, de-
clining crawling peg, restrictive wage 
policy and tighter fiscal policies brought 
a steady fall in inflation to 10–11 per 
cent by 1999. Although the decelerating 
devaluations of the nominal exchange 
rate led to some appreciation in the real 
exchange rate, this was relatively moder-
ate in terms of relative consumer and 
producer price indices. However, the real 
exchange rate, measured in relative real 
unit labour cost, depreciated further in 
the second half of the 1990s, as in-
creases in labour productivity were over-
taken by increases in real wages. 
The fiscal adjustment and restrictive 
wage policy caused the GDP growth rate 
to falter in 1995–6, so that Hungary 
grew much less than its neighbours did. 
However, growth accelerated again in 
1997, driven by strong increases in ex-
ports and fixed investment. The output 
recovery, unlike that of the early 1990s, 
was accompanied by improvement in the 
external accounts. There was a sharp 
decline in the current-account deficit 
(from 9 to 2 per cent of GDP in 1994–
7) and a decline in Hungary’s net for-
eign debt (from 45 per cent of GDP in 
1994 to 25 per cent in 1998). 
The decline in Hungary’s indebted-
ness resulted mainly from the decline in 
the current-account deficit, but also from 
the large FDI inflows in the second half 
of the decade. These were actually larger 
than the current-account deficits for 
three consecutive years (1995–7), and 
involved both greenfield of some 2–3 per 
cent of GDP per annum, and large pri-
vatization transactions (Figure 2). The 
accumulated stock of FDI amounted to 
US$ 16 billion in late 1998 – the equiva-
lent of a third of GDP, the highest pro-
portion in the region. This contributed to 
a sharp drop in external indebtedness 
and to greater penetration of foreign 
markets and consequent export growth. 
Hungary entered 1998 with a much 
healthier economy and seemed finally to 
be meeting the conditions for sustained 
growth. The recovery was being driven 
by exports and investment and under-
pinned by important structural reforms. 
The growth of real wages and pensions 
caused a recovery of private consump-
tion after two years’ decline, but the 
growth of real wages was kept below 
productivity growth and the increase in 
private consumption did not outpace the 
growth of GDP. Although the fiscal 
situation in 1998 still needed careful 
monitoring, it did not seem to cause any 
strong crowding out of private invest-
ment. On the contrary, the fiscal deficit 
did not seem to be pressing the real ex-
change rate or causing problems for ex-
port performance, as indicated by a re-
duction in relative, real unit labour 
costs. Public debt had fallen drastically 
(from 90 to 60 per cent of GDP), 
thanks to smaller deficits and large pri-
vatization revenues. The share of the 
private sector in domestic credit was in-
creasing steadily, and nominal and real 
lending rates had fallen. Altogether there 
seemed to be ample room for further 
expansion in output without excessive 
pressure on the current account. 
1.5. Trade and current-account 
developments in 1998 
After three years of steady decline, the 
current-account deficit more than dou-
bled between 1997 and 1998 (from 2.1 
to 4.8 per cent of GDP). The increase in 
the trade account deficit amounted to 
0.6 per cent of GDP, or only one fourth 
of the total increase in the current defi-
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cit. More important were the decrease in 
the surplus of services (1.1 per cent of 
GDP) and the increase in the deficit of 
income (1.1 per cent of GDP), the latter 
largely the result of a nearly US$ 500 
million increase in net profit remittances. 
The increase in the current-account defi-
cit and the decline in the flow of FDI 
(to a level insufficient to cover the cur-
rent-account deficit) resulted in an in-
crease in gross and net external debts, 
and as a share of GDP - after three 
consecutive years of decline. 
To some extent, it is not surprising 
that export growth should have slowed 
down from its torrid pace in 1997 
(about 30 per cent in volume growth), 
since this unusually fast rate resulted 
from substantial greenfield FDI coming 
on stream after being initiated earlier in 
the decade. Since many exports rely on 
imported intermediate and investment 
goods, import growth also accelerated in 
1997 and slowed in 1998, although the 
continuing expansion of fixed investment 
and renewed growth of pri-
vate consumption also af-
fected imports and the trade 
account. Overall, the in-
crease in the trade deficit in 
1998 does not seem to have 
been a major cause for 
concern. 
By contrast, the in-
crease in remitted profits 
was so abrupt and of such 
magnitude that it merits 
further analysis. As shown 
in Figure 2, the shift in the 
current account preceded the shift in the 
trade account, and became yet more 
pronounced at the end of the year. (Both 
series are constructed on a 12-month 
rolling basis.) This outcome was due in 
large part to very large profit remit-
tances in June and December by a few 
large companies. Although profit remit-
tances tend to peak in those two 
months, especially December, the unusual 
size of the transfers drove the ratio of 
remitted profits to lagged stock of FDI 
from 2 per cent (the average for 1993–
7) to 6 per cent at the end of 1998. 
1.6. EU membership and income 
convergence 
Hungary presented its membership appli-
cation to the EU in April 1994. Hungary 
and the then European Communities (EC) 
had already signed an association com-
pact (Europe Agreement) in 1991, which 
became effective as the legal basis for 
Hungary–EU relations in 1994. Its aim 
was to provide a framework for political 
dialogue, technical and financial assis-
tance for Hungary’s integration into the 
EU, and expansion of trade and eco-
nomic relations between the parties. 
The growth effects of economic in-
tegration with the EU was apparent to 
Hungary in the experiences of Ireland, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain (Table 3). 
Ireland’s income per capita started 
converging slowly with those of other EU 
countries soon after accession, but accel-
erated in the mid-1990s, 20 years after 
entry. Spain and Portugal showed a 
steady pattern of convergence, although 
Portugal converged faster, in part be-
cause it started from a lower initial 
base. Greece’s income gap with the EU 
countries actually widened after entry. 
Although it started catching up in the 
1990s, its relative position has not im-
Table 3
Per capita GDP of EC entrants, 1960–98, 
with date of accession 
 
GDP per capita at PPP (EU average = 100) 
Country    
(accession) 1960 1973 1981 1986 1990 1995 1998
Index
 1998
Ireland (1973) 61 59 65 64 74 96 108 184.4
Greece (1981) 44 71 69 63 58 66 68 98.8
Portugal (1986) 40 58 56 44 61 71 72 132.9
Spain (1986) 57 75 70 70 77 79 81 115.9
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proved since its date of accession. Except 
for Greece, these countries experienced 
investment booms after accession, driven 
primarily by reduced political risk, re-
structuring of capital stock in response 
to new trade and production patterns, 
and introduction of new technologies, 
accompanied by increased FDI. The 
opening of the capital account also 
played an important role, so that entry 
was generally accompanied by an in-
crease in capital inflows. 
Hungary approached EU accession 
with a per capita income about 49 per 
cent of the EU average at purchasing 
power parity (PPP). Hungary had the 
lowest fertility rate of all acceding coun-
tries and one of the highest education 
standards. The ratio of fixed investment 
to GDP in 1998 was 23.2 per cent, 
which was lower than the average for 
middle-income countries (25 per cent in 
1997), and for all acceding countries 
except Poland. Finally, the quality of the 
policy framework, while below the aver-
age for the EU l3, was adequate to sup-
port integration and growth. Table 4 
shows that if these conditions were main-
tained, Hungary would have an average 
annual growth rate almost 1.5 per cent 
above the EU average. This being so, it 
would need 24 years to converge to 75 
per cent and 57 years to converge to 
100 per cent of the average EU income 
level. 
However, if levels of fixed invest-
ment were permanently raised to 28 per 
cent of GDP (the government’s medium-
term target), Hungary could grow at a 
rate about 2.2 percentage points per an-
num above the EU average. I.e., an in-
crease in fixed investment of roughly 5 
per cent of GDP would bring an annual 
growth increment of about 0.7 per cent 
of GDP. This may not seem striking, but 
it would reduce the period of full con-
vergence to 41 years. Increasing the in-
vestment ratio and improving the quality 
of the policy framework to EU levels 
would increase the average annual 
growth rate to 3.7 percentage points 
above the EU average, dramatically re-
ducing the convergence period to 22 
years. 
1.7. Foreign trade and competi-
tiveness 
Achieving sustainable, rapid growth be-
fore and since EU accession has required 
a strong export performance. This, in 
turn, hinges critically on the ability of 
Hungarian firms to compete in a single 
European market. 
The challenge of readjusting trade 
patterns in the early 1990s proved for-
midable. The competitiveness of Hungar-
ian exports to Western markets had 
been declining for two decades. Many 
Hungarian firms had confined themselves 
to ‘soft’, COMECON markets devoid of 
competition and dominated by products 
of poorer quality. Further-
more, the shift to converti-
ble currencies in COMECON 
trade, combined with rap-
idly falling import demand 
in the Soviet Union, caused 
significant deterioration in 
Hungary’s terms of trade, 
especially with the Soviet 
Union. 
Hungary successfully 
met these challenges. After a 5 per cent 
drop in total exports in 1991 and a fur-
ther 13 per cent drop in 1993, Hungary 
increased its export volume by 17 per 
cent in 1994, to a level exceeding that 
Table 4 
Years required for Hungary to catch up with the EU income 
average 
 
Convergence to: I/GDP=23.5% I/GDP=28% I/GDP=28% 
75% of EU 15 average 24 19 12 
100% of EU 15 average 57 41 22 
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of 1989. Thereafter, exports continued to 
increase rapidly, with the share sold to 
developed countries reaching about 70 
per cent. Changes on the import side 
were even more pronounced, so that the 
process of geographical reorientation to 
market-driven patterns of foreign trade 
was quickly achieved. 
The proximity of the EU countries 
and their high GDP quickly made them 
Hungary’s biggest trading partners. The 
15 EU countries accounted for 34 per 
cent of Hungary’s total exports in 1989, 
but 50 per cent in 1991. After the trade 
terms of the Europe Agreement came 
into force in 1992, the share rose to 
more than 70 per cent in 1997, repre-
senting a massive reorientation of Hun-
gary’ s exports to EU markets. 
The scope and depth of a country’s 
integration into EU goods markets offer 
important insights into the ability of 
firms to compete in a single market. 
With the EU share in its trade turnover 
amounting to some two-thirds, Hungary 
is actually more integrated than several 
of the EU 15, where the average propor-
tion of intra-EU trade was 61 per cent 
in 1990-96. This integration of Hun-
gary’s took place as competition from 
imports from EU suppliers became more 
intense. After 1995, tariffs on industrial 
products were slashed by 15 per cent a 
year, to reach zero in 2001. It appears 
that Hungarian firms have been quite 
successful so far in a more competitive 
environment. 
Two phases in Hungary’s exports 
to the EU can be distinguished: 1989–92 
and 1994–7. In the first phase, the ex-
pansion of exports to the EU, triggered 
by the collapse of former COMECON mar-
kets and liberalization of imports and 
the exchange-rate regime, was driven 
mainly by redirection of manufactures to 
Western markets. Value increased by 76 
per cent between 1989 and 1992. This 
expansion lost steam in 1993, when the 
value of exports to the EU fell by 12 
per cent. 
The expansion of Hungary’s com-
mercial ties with the EU had a discerni-
ble impact on the composition of its ex-
ports, whose expansion was driven 
mainly by manufactures. The share of 
manufactures in Hungarian exports to 
the EU rose from 55 per cent in 1989 
to 85 per cent in 1997. The driving 
force here has come from machinery 
and transport equipment: 47 per cent by 
1997 and growth of 444 per cent over 
the 1992–7 period. 
Secondly, contrary to widespread 
perceptions, there was no collapse of 
agricultural exports. Although the share 
of agricultural products in the export 
total fell from 31 per cent in 1989 to 10 
per cent in 1997, Hungary’s share of EU 
external imports of these products fell 
by only 0.08 percentage points in 1989–
97. 
The opening of an economy, with 
increasing globalization of production 
triggered by reduced costs of transporta-
tion and information, usually leads to 
greater specialization and improved com-
petitiveness. Because of the changed insti-
tutional environment and a favourable 
climate for foreign investment in Hun-
gary, the capacity of its firms to com-
pete internationally significantly improved, 
outperforming suppliers from many other 
countries. The share of Hungarian-made 
production in EU external imports (ex-
cluding intra-EU trade) increased each 
year between 1989 and 1997 except in 
1993. 
Hungary’s export structure has 
been shifting towards capital and tech-
nology-intensive products and becoming 
higher value-added in terms of process-
ing. According to classifications of 48 
commodities developed by the World 
Bank for analysing different levels of 
processing, the share of primary and 
intermediate-stage products in 48 com-
modity chains has been declining since 
1989, while the share of final-stage 
products has significantly increased. This 
shift toward final-stage products also 
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showed in shares of EU external imports. 
Taking the averages for 1989–92 and 
1994–7, final-stage products were the 
only group to increase presence on EU 
markets. In fact, the share of final-stage 
products in EU imports increased re-
markably, by over 30 per cent between 
1989 and 1997. 
The Hungarian export basket has 
moved visibly towards higher processing 
value-added. An increasing portion is 
processed domestically. As costs are in-
ternationally competitive, there is nothing 
wrong in exporting primary commodities, 
but the movement up the processing 
chain signifies a more sophisticated and 
mature industrial structure. 
The Hungarian experience since 
1990 provides strong evidence of the ad-
vantages of opening to foreign capital. 
Dramatic shifts in the composition of ex-
ports and Hungary’s successful reintegra-
tion into international markets demon-
strate how investment by transnationals, 
and to a lesser extent, outward process-
ing have led to rapid modernization and 
readjustment of industrial capacities. 
Although Hungary’s is a relatively 
small transition economy, it was the 
largest recipient of FDI until 1994, when 
it was surpassed by Poland. Hungary 
regained top place in 1995 through pri-
vatization deals and came third after 
Poland and Russia in 1996–7. In the 
1990–96 period overall, Hungary and 
Poland received between them over half 
the cumulative FDI flows into the region. 
In terms of annual flows relative to GDP 
and in FDI per capita, Hungary was the 
top recipient throughout the 1990–97 
period. 
Foreign firms have played a domi-
nant role in industrial restructuring. 
They are much more foreign-trade ori-
ented than domestic firms are, so mak-
ing a relatively larger contribution to 
Hungary’s reintegration into the world 
economy. Although firms with foreign 
capital generated 47 per cent of total 
net sales and provided 29 per cent of 
total employment in 1996, their shares of 
exports and imports were 60 and 64 
per cent, respectively. These shares in-
creased in 1997 to 73 per cent of ex-
ports and 72 per cent of imports. 
An important feature of FDI in 
Hungary is its scope in terms of sectors 
covered and actual number of foreign-
owned firms. Although manufacturing 
received the largest FDI inf1ows (US$ 4.2 
billion) in 1992–6 and accounted for 40 
per cent of the foreign investment stock 
in 1996, other sectors of the economy, 
such as public utilities and energy (the 
‘big’ privatization of 1996) attracted US$ 
1.5 billion. Since foreign firms account 
for almost three-quarters of Hungary’s 
foreign turnover and that this share bas 
been rapidly increasing, they are largely 
responsible for the spectacular improve-
ment in Hungary’s export performance 
on EU markets. Successful development 
of a number of product groups can be 
traced to product activities by transna-
tionals, including automotive parts (VW 
and Audi car engines accounted for 9 
per cent of all Hungary’s exports to the 
EU in 1996) and electronics. There is 
abundant evidence of rapid progress in 
incorporating manufacturing capacity lo-
cated in Hungary into global production 
networks, usually by large transnationals. 
None of the medium-sized and large 
firms in the country are wholly owned 
by Hungarian shareholders and the top 
100 Hungarian firms include several eas-
ily recognizable subsidiaries. Estimates of 
intra-industry trade suggest that the 
number of such companies in Hungary 
is higher than it is in some EU 15 mem-
bers (e.g. Finland, Greece or Portugal). 
The experience with FDI in Hun-
gary allays fears that preferential trading 
arrangements with a highly developed EU 
may lead to a wholesale flight of domes-
tic industry. 
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1.8. Foreign trade policies: grad-
ual and uneven liberalization 
The state foreign-trade monopoly, central 
allocation of convertible currency and the 
requirement to surrender hard-currency 
earnings left little room for trade liber-
alization under central planning up to 
1987–8. But in contrast to Poland’s stabi-
lization transformation programme, Hun-
gary’s liberalization of foreign trade and 
exchange rates was achieved gradually, 
in 20–25 per cent increments over a 
four-year period, beginning with the lib-
eralization of capital-goods imports in 
1989. As central controls were eroded, 
so the process began to accelerate. Ra-
tioning of imports of intermediate goods 
was abandoned in 1990, as were quotas 
on a number of consumer goods, albeit 
perhaps somewhat reluctantly and in-
completely. 
The change in market access was 
enormous. Not a single sector had been 
open in 1987 to competition from im-
ports (or for that matter, any competi-
tion at all), whereas by 1990, about 70 
per cent of domestic production faced 
external competition. 
Another powerful force for liberal-
izing the foreign trade regime came 
from preferential trade agreements, espe-
cially the Europe Agreement and Central 
European Free Trade Agreements (CEFTA), 
which envisaged free trade in industrial 
products among Hungary, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia. By 
the early 2000s, the EU was the source 
of almost 74 per cent of Hungary’s im-
ports of manufactures. Including those 
from the CEFTA and EFTA countries, well 
over 80 per cent of imports were tariff 
free. 
The importance of the December 
1991 Europe Agreement was that it was 
made with Hungary’s largest natural 
trading partner. The interim trade 
agreement that went into effect in 
March 1992 eliminated duties on about 
a third of all industrial products im-
ported from the EU – mainly those re-
quired by domestic industry. Beginning in 
1995, Hungary’s tariff concessions for 
industrial products went into effect, so 
that rates on EU industrial imports were 
slashed by 15 per cent a year until 
2001, when, with some minor exceptions, 
they were eliminated for all industrial 
products. 
Hungary’s foreign trade policy 
raises a question about its links with ex-
port performance. Empirical research 
strongly suggests that all development 
success stories over the past two decades 
have been based on a strong export ori-
entation, combined with low or falling 
barriers to imports. Yet Hungary re-
corded its largest export expansion dur-
ing a temporary reversal of foreign-trade 
liberalization after the 1995 stabilization 
programme. Furthermore, it began a 
year before the 9 per cent devaluation 
of the forint. The conclusion must be 
drawn that Hungary is an exception to 
the general rule. 
One explanatory factor is that 
Hungary was attracting foreign investors 
by keeping them immune from the vaga-
ries of its foreign-trade policies. A duty 
waiver mechanism allowed exporters to 
disregard tariff rates on imports of in-
puts for exports; other provisions main-
tained duty exemptions on imports of 
capital equipment. An investor wanting 
to avoid burdensome customs procedures 
could establish a de jure free-trade zone 
outside Hungary’s customs territory. 
Many used the device. The proportion of 
total exports made by firms constituting 
free-trade zones rose from 11 per cent 
in 1995 to 19 per cent in 1996 and to 
26 per cent in 1997. Together with out-
ward processing, the share of exports 
generated from such sources came to 47 
per cent of total exports. This liberal 
approach to foreign firms made a sig-
nificant contribution to export expansion. 
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On the other hand, the foreign 
trade measures in the 1995 stabilization 
package seem to have had damaged the 
export response of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). Import users in 
such firms incurred losses by paying 
more for imports. Although the draw-
back mechanism allows them to recoup 
extra taxes on imports, this mechanism 
was costly to use and created a consid-
erable administrative burden in terms of 
processing information for customs. The 
transaction costs may have been too high 
to warrant the extra effort involved in 
getting a refund on the exported portion 
of imports, so that the arrangements 
seemed unattractive to SMEs. 
Tariff rates on industrial products 
were still much higher in Hungary than 
in the EU. To ease adjustment to future 
membership and improve growth per-
formance during the pre-accession stage, 
Hungary had to consider adopting the 
EU (preferably post-Uruguay Round) 
MFN tariff schedule for industrial prod-
ucts. As a result, the average (simple) 
MFN tariff rate on industrial products 
fell from about 8 to about 4 per cent. 
This measure had several advan-
tages. It would level the playing field for 
MFN suppliers to both Hungarian and 
EU markets. It was simple and easy to 
implement. There was little, if any, do-
mestic opposition from sectors competing 
with imports, which already faced for-
midable EU competitors. The measure 
could also counteract the threat of FDI 
falling off as the advantages of free-
trade zones were eroded. Finally, it re-
quired no formal notification to the 
WTO of a change in statutory rates: 
Hungary could simply lower rates to 
match those of the EU without changing 
statutory and binding rates. 
1.9. The corporate sector in 
transition 
Capitalism was not wholeheartedly em-
braced in Hungary when communism 
collapsed. Economists and the public 
alike distrusted privatization after experi-
ence of self-serving and asset stripping 
in the late 1980s. Moreover, earlier de-
bates about how to make central plan-
ning work better had heightened aware-
ness of alternative structures of owner-
ship and governance. So while the gov-
ernment was not averse to privatization 
as such, most economists argued that 
passive, dispersed private owners would 
oversee managers no more effectively 
than the state had. So the government 
sought from the outset to recruit respon-
sible owners for firms, eschewing vouch-
ers and other mass privatization tech-
niques. Sales of controlling stakes to in-
siders was also rare: although managers 
and employees could buy shares at a 5–
10 per cent discount, there were fewer 
than 100 cases where they bought a ma-
jority stake. Selling such a stake to for-
eigners was the logical alternative to sell-
ing to insiders or to mass privatization. 
Table 5 shows the evolving owner-
ship of manufacturing firms in recent 
years. The state divested its assets in fits 
and starts. Several hundred state firms 
were turned over to the municipalities. 
Table 5 
Ownership of manufacturing firms, 
% of registered capital 
 
Types of ownership 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
State 55.2 39.2 29.3 19.9 14.4 
Municipal 8.8 1.6 1.6 1.0 0.9 
Individual private  8.8 9.4 10.1 9.5 
Domestic corporate 0.1 15.0 17.9 18.2 19.4 
Employee 20.5 1.0 1.5 1.4 1.2 
Foreign 3.6 30.9 37.1 46.7 51.1 
Cooperative  2.6 1.9 1.4 1.2 
Other  0.9 1.3 1.3 2.3 
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When the State Property Agency (ÁVU) 
was formed in March 1990, it took con-
trol of 1,857 state-owned enterprises 
(1,700 industrial, the rest agricultural). 
These state enterprises were converted 
into company forms for eventual privati-
zation. 
Firms were sold mainly for cash 
through auctions and tenders, although 
about 7 per cent of state assets were 
sold for compensation certificates distrib-
uted to victims of the fascist and com-
munist regimes. Municipalities, having 
accepted these certificates as payment 
when apartments were privatized to ten-
ants, either sold these certificates on the 
secondary market for cash or used them 
to buy shares. 
Although the ÁVU had divested 
about 75 per cent of its initial holdings 
by mid-1995, this amounted to only 35 
per cent of the state’ s stake, as the 
State Property PLC (ÁVRt) held the big-
gest firms: power, gas, airlines, railways 
(a huge loss-maker), telecommunications, 
banking and some chemical firms. Priva-
tization received its final and much 
needed boost in 1995 when the govern-
ment, supported by the central bank, 
drastically reduced the list of firms it 
would continue to own (to the railways, 
postal services and national parks), as 
part of the stabilization package. As part 
of this effort, the APVRt (successor to 
the AVRt) was merged with the AVU 
and given a clear mandate to sell some 
HUF 1.3 trillion of equity, out of the 
HUF 1.6 trillion it held. Again as part of 
this effort, the Privatization Act was 
amended in June 1997 to allow the sale 
of all but ‘golden shares’ in 18 firms 
previously considered strategic, including 
the savings bank (OTP) and the tele-
communications company (MATÁV). Ma-
jority and minority holdings in 116 firms 
and golden shares in 27 others would 
remain in state hands. By the end of 
1997, HUF 790 billion of equity had 
been sold, in addition to what had been 
transferred to the social security funds 
and the municipalities. 
To contribute to the restructuring 
needs of the newly privatized firms, they 
were given 20 per cent of the privatiza-
tion receipts as a grant. The remaining 
proceeds, net of the privatization agency’ 
s direct sales expenses (about 5 per cent 
of revenues), went into the government 
budget 
The meagre privatization revenues 
of the early 1990s were little temptation 
to prof1igacy, but the 1995 decision to 
privatize almost all remaining state-
owned firms triggered a heated debate 
over how to spend the proceeds. The 
government decided it would be impru-
dent to spend non-recurring privatization 
receipts on recurring expenditures and 
transfers, especially as the stabilization 
package was seeking to keep the budget 
deficit sustainable. So the bulk of the 
annual receipts were used to reduce out-
standing public debt (in domestic and 
foreign currency). This cut government 
indebtedness from 86 per cent of GDP 
in 1995 to 60 per cent in 1998. Privati-
zation receipts clearly played a major 
role in this, although economic growth 
since 1995 also contributed. 
1.10. The role of FDI 
Hungary had attracted some US$ 16 bil-
lion in FDI by 1997 and the average 
annual increment of more than 5 per 
cent of GDP between 1991 and 1997 
was exceptionally high. About a third of 
this flow went to wholly foreign-owned 
firms and the rest to joint ventures and 
partly foreign-owned firms. 
Germany was the biggest source 
for FDI through privatization (about 35 
per cent), followed by the United States 
(20 per cent) and France (12 per cent). 
New foreign investment legislation in 
1998 allowed foreigners the same protec-
tion as domestic firms and abolished the 
distinction between affiliates and 
branches of foreign companies. Hungary 
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now has about 30,000 firms in which 
there is foreign participation, of which 
about a third – mainly larger ones – 
are wholly foreign owned. The propor-
tion of wholly foreign-owned firms is 
likely to rise, as they were accounting 
for almost two-thirds of new incorpora-
tions in 1997. This suggests a shift from 
arm’s-length Hungarian subsidiaries to-
wards well-integrated transnational op-
erations. FDI was most widespread in 
manufacturing (particularly food process-
ing and mechanical engineering, where 
over half the assets were in firms with 
some FDI by the end of 1996, up from 
a fifth in 1992. In manufacturing, wholly 
(91 to 100 per cent) foreign-owned FDI 
firms tripled to reach 1857 in 1996, ac-
counting for 70 per cent of foreign-
owned assets. 
Most firms in export promotion 
zones (over three quarters of whose ex-
ports were electronic items) had at least 
a proportion of foreign ownership. Al-
though firms with FDI were scattered, 
they tended to be concentrated in the 
western half of the country, perhaps be-
cause of transport and infrastructure 
advantages. Firms with FDI were more 
trade-oriented, exporting almost half 
their sales, as opposed to a fifth by non-
FDI firms. (These proportions are decep-
tive, however, because exports of the 
latter often appear as domestic sales to 
exporting firms.) The findings should not 
be surprising: foreign investors rarely set 
up ventures in small, non-traded activi-
ties. So firms with FDI are generally ex-
port (and import) intensive and often 
fund suppliers facing liquidity or invest-
ment constraints. FDI firms also tend to 
be less labour intensive than domestic 
firms are, although the difference may 
be smaller than the data suggest. Do-
mestic firms may underreport the work-
ers on their payroll, due to a legacy of 
incorporated work units and a tempta-
tion to evade high payroll tax and con-
tribution rates. Despite the concentration 
of firms with FDI in Western Hungary 
and Budapest, the benefits were widely 
dispersed throughout the country.  
2) BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:  
A CONTINUING ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL EXPERIMENT 
Eight years after the transition process 
began, the expected ‘blooming landscape’ 
seems more like a mirage for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Economic development 
has hardly started. The economy is un-
sustainable and the ‘development dia-
mond’ out of reach of the country’s citi-
zens. Sixty per cent of young people 
surveyed said they would prefer to leave 
the country. 
2.1. The economy before 1991 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is about one-
and-a-quarter times the size of Switzer-
land and almost as mountainous – four-
fifths of the territory. About 60 per cent 
is above 500 metres, and some 45 per 
cent forested. Only a small fraction of 
the farmland is of a quality suited to 
modern agricultural techniques. The cli-
mate is Continental Mediterranean, suited 
to cereal production. The two main riv-
ers have major hydroelectric potential. 
Between the Second World War and 
1991, when Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
one of six federal republics of former 
Yugoslavia, it achieved significant eco-
nomic development. Economic growth av-
eraged 5 per cent a year. Per capita 
income in 1991 was US$ 2400, excluding 
the service sector (as was the accounting 
practice in socialist economies).  
Twelve big firms produced 35 per 
cent of the GDP, four generating over 
40 per cent of the republic’s exports. 
Firms were organized as self-managed 
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companies of associated labour in a self-
managed market economy, seen as half-
way between central planning and a 
modern market economy. Bosnia’s main 
trade partners in 1990–91 were the So-
viet Union, Germany and Italy; its trade 
with the EC countries in 1991 was in a 
surplus. The main export sectors were 
chemicals, ferrous metallurgy, metal 
processing, leather footwear, electrical 
appliances, finished wood, timber and 
panels, and finished textiles.3 
A brief account of the period can 
be presented in tabular form, which rec-
ommends itself due to the role of ‘path-
dependence’ approach taken in discussing 
and creating the first best or second 
best solution for Bosnia and Herzego-
vina’s future. 
Table 6 
Pre-war position of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Political setting Republic of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
Political system Self-managed socialism. 
Economic system Self-management. 
Living standards 
Well-balanced income distri-
bution (half Switzerland’s at 
PPP).4 
Social security Full coverage. 
Political democracy Second to the OECD.5 
Economic democracy Highest level.6 
Ethnic configuration Multi-ethnic republic (‘leopard skin’). 
 
                                                 
3 Poeschl (1999). 
4 Meier (1995), p. 15.  
5 Vanek (1991). 
6 Ibid. 
2.2. Post-war Bosnia and Herze-
govina 
As former Yugoslavia dissolved in 1991–
2, Slovenia and Croatia declared inde-
pendence and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
followed suit. The war in Bosnia began 
in April 1992, in the same month that 
the EU and United States recognized 
Bosnia as an independent state and a 
month before its admission to the United 
Nations. 
Pre-war Bosnia had almost 4.4 mil-
lion inhabitants, as opposed to a present 
estimated population of 3.8 million. By 
the end of the war in December 1995 
and during its aftermath, 1.5 million 
people fled the country as refugees, of 
whom 600,000 still live in temporary 
locations abroad, while an estimated 
700,000 or more are registered resi-
dents abroad. Other refugees have re-
turned, often involuntarily, most to 
places dominated by their own ethnic 
group, not to their former domicile. 
Some highly qualified people arranged 
their own emigration during and after 
the war, often not being classed as 
refugees at all. Inside the country, the 
war displaced large numbers of people. 
These peaked at 1.3 million in 1995 and 
were down to 800,000 by the end of 
1998. Those internally displaced generally 
suffered more than those who fled the 
country did.  
About 60 per cent of the popula-
tion in 1998 lived in poverty, defined as 
earnings permitting a family of four to 
purchase less than two-thirds of a de-
fined consumer basket of basic needs. 
About a quarter of the people in poverty 
in the (Bosniac-Croat) Federation of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina were employed. Av-
erage net salaries in the commercial sec-
tor could buy only about 68 per cent of 
the consumer basket and those in the 
non-commercial sector about 87 per 
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cent. Only employees in financial institu-
tions and public administration earned 
enough to be on or just above that pov-
erty line. The pension and the unem-
ployment compensation systems are in 
deficit, paying out late and below the 
minimum. Average daily income for im-
poverished persons was so low that they 
had to survive on financial support from 
relatives in the country, relatives and 
friends living abroad, international hu-
manitarian assistance, and activities in 
the shadow or informal economy. 
Official statistics record quite im-
pressive GDP growth rates: 21 per cent 
in 1995, 69 per cent in 1996, 30 per 
cent in 1997 and 18 per cent in 1998. 
But GDP had fallen to such a low level 
during the war that the increases 
achieved afterwards were relatively dis-
appointing. The country still produces far 
less than it did before the war. Many 
production facilities have yet to be re-
paired or replaced or are under-utilized. 
Employment is correspondingly low. Re-
cent GDP growth has been predominantly 
aid-driven, as reflected in the balance of 
payments. The current-account deficit in 
1996 amounted to almost half the nomi-
nal GDP, declining to about one-fifth in 
the first half of 1999 in the Federation. 
Only about 25 per cent of imports were 
met by exports in the first five months 
of 1999 in both the Federation and the 
(Bosnian Serb-led) Republika Srpska.  
When considering the development 
strategy and its effects so far, one has 
to consider several external and internal 
factors of an economic and political na-
ture. Two determining external factors 
globalization of the world economy with 
the Washington consensus, which pro-
vides the basis for discussing transition 
countries and their transformation into 
‘small open economies’, and the 1995 
Dayton Peace Accord. Signed on Decem-
ber 14, 1995 in Paris, the accord ended 
military hostilities in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina and fixed its external borders. The 
Bosniac, Croat and Serb parties agreed 
on an independent state, with Sarajevo 
as its capital. NATO forces were to im-
plement the accord for a limited period, 
followed by international bodies (OSCE, 
OHR and UN). The accord outlines the 
constitution of the state, which provides 
for full freedom of movement of per-
sons, goods, services and capital. The 
two internal entities established were the 
Federation, with 51 per cent of the terri-
tory, and Republika Srpska with 49 per 
cent. The Federation has 10 cantons. 
While Dayton placed banking and 
customs regulation on the central state 
level, fiscal policy was transferred to the 
entities and cantons. No instruments were 
provided for countrywide macroeconomic 
policy. This hampered the central state 
when formulating a strategy for eco-
nomic development, including industrial 
policy. In practice, Bosnia and Herzego-
vina lacks the powers to formulate and 
pursue independent monetary, fiscal, 
price and foreign-exchange policies, and 
policies on privatization, incomes, and 
social welfare. Industrial policy-making is 
effectively impossible under the rules of 
Washington consensus applied to the 
country by the international financial in-
stitutions. 
Development prospects in such a 
poor country were poor, as the initial 
level was so low. Bosnia and Herzego-
vina had no developed market institu-
tions and no strong government to im-
plement any alternative package of de-
velopment and macroeconomic policies. 
The policy package coming from and 
implemented by the IMF and the World 
Bank has been seen as the only way of 
achieving stabilization, preparing the 
ground for privatization, and developing 
macroeconomic policy under better politi-
cal circumstances. Yet the evidence seems 
to suggest otherwise. The ‘Frankenstein’ 
economy simply does not perform as ex-
pected. 
A basic strategy for recovery and 
the role of government was published in 
1996, in a chapter entitled ‘Towards es-
tablishing a market economy’, in the 
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document Bosnia and Herzegovina on the 
road to recovery, prepared by the 
World Bank, the European Commission 
and the EBRD. The package contains all 
the elements adopted in theory and prac-
tice in other Eastern European countries. 
One unique element not needed else-
where was physical post-war reconstruc-
tion. 
The document envisaged rapid pri-
vatization, dismantling of state firms, and 
development of SMEs, light industry and 
the service sector, as basic means of 
economic growth. It continued, “The role 
of the state in the economic and devel-
opment strategy which is governed by 
the private sector is not unimportant, 
but shifts its focus. It should concentrate 
on the maintenance of healthy macro-
economic conditions and on the estab-
lishment of a relevant legal and institu-
tional framework, which motivates unin-
terrupted functioning of a free market 
and provides basic public goods and so-
cial services, such as defence, public or-
der, education, health services.7 
The reform of banks and firms 
was a major project that had to be im-
plemented, the document stated. Sizeable 
inherited bad credits and old foreign-
currency accounts had to be excluded 
from banks’ balance sheets. At the same 
time, large and inefficient state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) had to be closed or 
restructured and privatized. In restruc-
turing firms and banks, the document 
considered the most appropriate ap-
proach would be for state institutions to 
adopt a flexible programme of privatiza-
tion to be applied regionally. The Repub-
lika Srpska would be one region and 
regions in the Federation might consist of 
a group of cantons, an individual canton 
or more local levels. This regional ap-
proach consequently provided the basis 
for the so-called ‘ethnic privatization’ 
that has become a nuisance and a divi-
sive factor, and split big companies into 
geographical parts. 
                                                 
7 World Bank (1996). 
Under the World Bank/IMF pro-
gramme, the central bank functioned as 
a currency board for six years, starting 
from 1996–7. This meant integrating 
Bosnia into international markets as a 
‘price taker’, with a fixed exchange rate 
for its national currency, which was 
pegged to the German mark (and now 
to the Euro). The country thereby lost 
the potential advantages offered by the 
effects of the Phillips. 
The package contained a hard 
budget constraint, which Bosnian authori-
ties accepted. A budget deficit could not 
be allowed to generate inflation. The ex-
ternal sector was given a significant role 
in the economic transition, as it had 
been in other transition countries. For-
eign trade is being liberalized as quickly 
and fully as possible. FDI and transna-
tionals are supposed to be main driving 
forces behind economic recovery. 
Left without its own monetary, for-
eign-exchange rate or balance-of-
payments policies and with different pri-
vatization policies in the two regions, the 
government could not even consider an 
industrial policy. Bosnia was left to free 
market forces and the international do-
nor community. Four years after peace 
came, GDP had reached a little over 50 
per cent of its pre-war level. However, 
since the pre-1991 method of calculating 
GDP excluded the service sector, today’s 
GDP is less than 50 per cent of what it 
was in 1991. 
Let us look at a series of basic 
macroeconomic data for January–
September 1999 and comparisons with 
the 1998 figures.8 Industrial production 
increased by 4.9 per cent over 1998 lev-
els in the Federation and by 1.5 per cent 
in Republika Srpska. Retail prices de-
creased slightly in the Federation (less 
than 1 per cent) but increased substan-
tially in Republika Srpska (13 per cent) 
compared to the 1998 level. Employment 
in the Federation reached 408,004, 3.2 
                                                 
8 Central Bank 2000. 
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per cent above the 1998 average, with 
about 69 per cent in the business sector 
and 31 per cent in the 
non-business sector. In Re-
publika Srpska, there were 
244,267 employees in 1997. 
In September 1999, 
149,214 people were look-
ing for a job in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina – 5 per 
cent more than at the end 
of 1998. Skilled workers 
made up 35.6 per cent of 
the unemployed and 1.1 
per cent had university de-
gree. Average net wages 
had increased by 5 per 
cent in the Federation and 
by 30.1 per cent in Repub-
lika Srpska since 1998. The 
deficit on the current ac-
count reached US$ 1,341 
million (two-thirds in the 
Federation and a third Republic Srpska). 
The trade deficit alone in January–
September 1999 was $1,408 million, with 
exports covering only 21.8 per cent of 
imports. A projection for the remainder 
of 1999 showed the value of exports 
running about 15 per cent below World 
Bank predictions.  
However, from the start of the 
World Bank recovery programme, the 
question had been where such huge ex-
ports could come from under a ‘de-
mand-management’ type of policy. Eco-
nomic recovery in Bosnia was approach-
ing the limits of its capacity to service 
its foreign debt. If foreign aid were re-
duced or stopped for any reason, GDP 
would enter the minus zone. The econ-
omy was not prepared for self-sustaining 
development. Turning to human re-
sources, unemployment was a major is-
sue alongside refugees, emigrants and 
internally displaced persons (see above). 
Despite the demand-managed reconstruc-
tion and recovery programme, over half 
the country’s potential workforce was 
unemployed at the beginning of 1999, 
according to a broad definition of job-
lessness (Table 7). 
Registered employment increased by 
about 4 per cent in 1999. Renewal of 
the workforce through entry of younger 
employees is a factor that tends to fa-
vour productivity. However, the opposite 
trend pertains in Bosnia, where most of 
the unemployed are in the 21–5 and 31–
5 age groups. A recent federal law 
seeking savings in the pension system by 
decreasing the number of pensioners 
could cause elderly workers to stay at 
work, so reducing the potential employ-
ment for younger, more productive peo-
ple. 
Even more counter-productive for 
productivity and job creation are the 
provisions of a recent Labour Act, al-
lowed those employed in 1991 to return 
to the same job by right or be compen-
sated by the employer if no longer 
needed. Yet most of the big firms were 
destroyed or demolished during the war, 
which drastically changed labour re-
quirements. The act imposes a serious 
financial burden on companies already 
facing financial pressures. It has endan-
gered the privatization process by mak-
ing firms less attractive for buyers as 
Table 7
Labour-market indicators in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1998 
 
 Federation Republika Srpska 
Whole 
country 
Population (projection) 2,250,000 1,392,000 3,642,000
Pop. of working age (15–64) 1,500,500 907,200 2,407,700
Workforce (total potential)  872,000 528,000 1,400,000
Officially unemployed 407,000 202,000 609,000
Registered unemployed 249,000 143,000 392,000
Laid off and deferred* 70,000 45,000 15,000
Registered/unreg. unemployed 465,000 326,000 791,000
Narrowly defined unempl. rate (%) 28.56 27.08 25.16
Unemployed + laid off (%) 36.58 35.61 36.21
Broadly defined unemployed (%) 53.33 61.74 56.50
* Firms keep waiting lists of workers not currently required 
Source: UNDP (1998). 
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restructuring targets. It has affected po-
tential industrial investment by diverting 
scarce financial resources from invest-
ment to private consumption. The act 
was strongly opposed by the World 
Bank and private business. It represents 
a vestige of the old self-management sys-
tem in Yugoslavia and evidence of in-
adequate institutional change in Bosnia’s 
transition process. 
In education, the war caused a se-
rious drop in primary and secondary 
school enrolment rates: down from 98 
and 90 per cent of the requisite age 
groups before the war to 82 and 75 
per cent in 1999. The number of univer-
sity students decreased by 30 per cent 
between 1991 and 1999. The figures re-
flect at least partly the anarchy in the 
country’s transition process. Human re-
sources are used in an inadequate, 
wasteful, useless way. For example, most 
highly educated Bosnians now work for 
international agencies in jobs that do not 
require their educational qualifications, 
so that they are lost to the productive 
economy. Another factor affecting human 
resources potential is low mobility, due 
to the housing shortage caused by war-
time destruction, to high unemployment 
and lack of job opportunities, to low 
pay precluding accommodation rental, 
and to loss of attractive markets in for-
mer Yugoslavia and of companies that 
produced for them. 
Institutional changes in the Bosnian 
society are slow. Privileges from the self-
management period are still prevalent. 
Workers are unaware of the radical 
changes taking place globally and even 
in their country’s constitution. They claim 
rights to a permanent job and other 
privileges that they enjoyed under the old 
regime. Governments are still controlled 
by nationalistic political parties, which 
select the chief executives and boards of 
the surviving SOEs. Even the federal 
president sits on the boards of some 
high-priority SOEs, usually the healthiest, 
best-performing ones. 
It is believed that the obstacles to 
development and adequate use of human 
capital can be removed by privatization 
and restructuring, but in fact, many 
other factors are involved. These include 
the newness of the privatization process 
and its unpromising political and eco-
nomic environment, the incomplete insti-
tutional changes, political corruption, an 
acute shortage of liquidity, and lack of 
an economic development strategy, other 
than the World Bank's, which relies on 
free market forces and FDI that are 
missing. Bosnia’s recovery programme 
still rests on a programme of ‘develop-
ment without a concept’ set by the in-
ternational community, relying on free 
markets doing the job and allowing ‘the 
chips to fall where they may.’ So a black 
or grey market equivalent to about 40 
per cent of GDP has developed and de-
grades the quality and decency of hu-
man resources. The system of values has 
changed, so that the priority for the 
Bosnian elite, managers and politicians 
has become to get rich quick through 
short-term speculation, while neglecting 
long-term objectives and visions based on 
the postulates of hard work and sus-
tained development. 
Generally speaking, the disintegra-
tion of former Yugoslavia in 1991 
stopped the processes of technology 
transfer and creation. After 1995, recon-
struction was at the top of the agenda 
for the government and the international 
community. Donor disbursements totalled 
over $2.13 billion between January 1996 
and August 1999, according to a 1999 
government document. Of this, 82 per 
cent went to rebuilding and reconstruct-
ing housing, energy, transport, water 
supplies, health services, education, social 
services and agriculture (about $1.75 bil-
lion on 4,500 projects); and 18 per cent 
went for credit projects for the business 
sector (about $385 million for 919 pro-
jects). So it is not surprising to find the 
business sector in its infancy and at a 
far from self-sustainable level. The inter-
national community has refused to pro-
 22 
vide capital to SOEs, regardless of their 
actual and potential viability and effi-
ciency. The modest amounts of credit 
available are awarded only to SMEs. 
On average, 85 per cent of equip-
ment in the business sector is obsolete. 
Companies were technologically backward 
before the war, which then destroyed 
much of the equipment. The international 
community does not support unprivatized 
firms.  
The short-sighted, narrowly based 
investment policies of the international 
community are one of the most contro-
versial aspects of its role in Bosnia. The 
modest financing provided for private 
SMEs is very short term. Credit terms on 
domestic borrowing, meanwhile, are ex-
tremely high: 1.5–3 per cent a month. 
Investment per job created was only KM 
20,000–30,000, with a low technological 
content (KM 1 = 0.56 Euros). The prod-
ucts then receive no effective tariff pro-
tection. All these factors force managers 
to think short term and ignore even 
slight possibilities of modernizing their 
companies. Any R and D activity is vol-
untarily done by individuals, out of per-
sonal enthusiasm. 
These realities and rigidities, along 
with the institutional malfunctioning or 
even absence of essential institutions, give 
support to the broadly supported and 
accepted argument that the Bosnian 
economy cannot move ahead without 
FDI. It is a vicious circle. Without capi-
tal, there is no technological change. 
Without technological change, there is no 
progress. There is no capital without 
transnationals and FDI. There is no FDI 
without free markets and a prosperous 
economic climate. There is no free mar-
ket with state intervention, or capital, 
because transnationals will not come, 
without which there is no capital and 
therefore no technological change. 
In May 1999, the European Com-
mission and the World Bank published a 
study9 describing three groups of barri-
ers to the development of domestic pri-
vate business and FDI: 
* Fiscal barriers: complicated fiscal pro-
cedures, unforeseen and retroactive 
taxes, uncoordinated taxes between 
Republika Srpska and the Federation. 
* Barriers related to an inappropriate 
and unreliable judicial system, includ-
ing lack of professionalism and insuf-
ficient transparency of ownership 
rights. 
* An extremely complex process for 
registering new businesses. 
The absence of technological pro-
gress and lack of a positive vision of the 
country’s future have left citizens with 
an insecure perspective on the possibili-
ties of improvement and progress. This 
has contributed seriously to the brain 
drain out of the country. 
Turning to the infrastructure,10 a 
World Economic Forum11 report sees sev-
eral basic parameters for measuring the 
creative technological potential of a 
country. Nine of these are listed with 
comments on how Bosnia is faring. 
* Investment in basic R and D: The 
country cannot realistically expect in-
vestment in R and D until the distant 
future, unless the international com-
munity changes its approach to devel-
opment of Bosnia and the Balkan re-
gion as a whole. 
* Average educational level: The indica-
tor was 25 per cent lower in 1999 
than in 1991, although investment in 
education is being heavily supported 
by the international community, so 
that an improved score might ensue 
as future student enrolment rises. 
There were predictions that the 1991 
                                                 
9 Bosnia… (1999). 
10 Contributions by F.  auševi  to the PHARE–ACE 
project ‘Supply-side strategy for productivity, 
competitiveness and convergence between CEECs 
and the EU’, 2000. 
11 Global… (1999). 
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enrolment level might be restored by 
2007.  
* Concentration of scientific and engi-
neering talent: Few young scientists 
existed as a basis for eventually build-
ing a significant cluster of talent. 
Many young scientists were leaving 
the country and most had been well 
received in the United States and the 
EU. Almost 60 per cent of graduates 
with a scientific and technical educa-
tion were becoming part of the brain 
drain. It might take 15 years for the 
country to restore its pre-war level of 
scientific talent. 
* Information-communication infrastruc-
ture: The network of information and 
communications was rebuilt and mod-
ernized with financing from the inter-
national community. Further improve-
ment in telecommunication services 
could be expected once the state PTT 
had been privatized. 
* Protection of intellectual property 
rights: Practically no appropriate regu-
lations existed.  
* Promotion of R and D activities: No 
special fiscal policy or law exists to 
stimulate R and D activities, except 
for one incentive that encourages re-
investing earnings there. 
* Venture capital: The supply is still 
tiny, from commercial banks in the 
country and from the many interna-
tional NGOs active in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina. World Bank data show that 
NGO-financed credits stimulated the 
creation of 40,000 new jobs in 1996–
8, but almost 60 per cent of the 
credits went to the trade sector and 
they averaged only KM 3,000 (1,500 
Euros) – a very small contribution to 
promoting business. 
* Openness to FDI and foreign trade: 
Since 1995, the country had had al-
most no tariff policy and could be 
simply depicted as a state without 
borders. Domestic producers faced an 
unfair trade position, disadvantaged 
by the doctrine of free trade and the 
lack of an appropriate institution to 
support and monitor the development 
of foreign trade. Foreign goods were 
cheaper than domestically produced 
goods by 30 per cent or more. Com-
bined with the great outflow of do-
mestic capital, the development of 
production and of the domestic pro-
ductive sectors is seriously hindered. 
* Level of demand sophistication: The 
domestic market is full of goods that 
lack certificates of origin and do not 
pass quality controls. However, given 
the low purchasing power of the 
population, goods are easily sold on 
the domestic market. 
Central to the situation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina after 1996 was the lim-
ited scale of its economy. Funds were 
too scarce to carry out necessary techno-
logical innovation, so that obsolescence 
was perpetuated. Average capacity utili-
zation was as low as 60–80 per cent in 
industry. Large companies languished or 
failed to restart after the war, although 
their managers claimed that quite small 
amounts of money (2–3 million Euros, 
for instance) would allow them to restart 
production. But the international commu-
nity did not want to finance the existing 
big companies. The position taken by the 
World Bank and the IMF on the future 
of SOEs precluded this possibility. The 
only route left was to develop SMEs. 
A big obstacle to rapid privatiza-
tion has been the prospect of still more 
joblessness and the difficult social situa-
tion this would create. Some estimates 
stated that privatization would increase 
the number of unemployed by significant 
amounts. 
Before the war, Bosnia was one of 
six republics of a single state and part 
of a single economic area that was very 
important to it. For example, Croatia 
and Slovenia accounted for over 37 per 
cent of Bosnia’s exports within Yugosla-
via and Serbia’s share was even larger. 
This export base has considerably weak-
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ened, particularly because the Dayton 
Accord effectively divided Bosnia and 
Herzegovina into two economic zones. 
This immediately raised the problem of 
trade between the two entities, which 
was in practice treated as international 
trade. It soon became clear that this re-
quired special attention, economically and 
politically. Inter-entity trade could con-
tribute to GNP growth and more efficient 
functioning of the market in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as a whole, while politically, 
it might act as an integrating factor, by 
stimulating cooperation between citizens 
of both entities. The significance of 
trade, domestic and foreign, to economic 
growth and development is beyond ques-
tion especially in today’s global environ-
ment. It is not surprising to find some 
economists, entrepreneurs and politicians 
(especially the Office of the High Repre-
sentative) arguing for trade as the inte-
grating factor to produce economic and 
political recovery in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina. 
Various OHR efforts have been 
made in this respect, to do with harmo-
nizing customs duties and taxes on so-
called high-tariff goods between the Fed-
eration of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Republika Srpska. The same aims explain 
the pressure that the OHR has put on 
the trade ministers of the two entities to 
cooperate, harmonize trade conditions, 
promote trade, and finally, lift various 
formal and informal restrictions on it. 
Inter-entity trade up to June 1998 was 
regulated by the entities themselves and 
resembled international rather than do-
mestic trade. Registered trade between 
them was accordingly modest in volume. 
The police in both entities had a more 
complete picture of the inter-entity trade, 
from monitoring it closely under the 
given political circumstances. Similarly, is 
trade in Bosnia and Herzegovina really 
the integrating factor to the extent ex-
pected by the politicians and the OHR? 
Does favouring inter-entity trade tend to 
stimulate trade diversion or trade crea-
tion? Under what circumstances can in-
ter-entity trade create or intensify a 
trade-generating effect, so as to act as 
an integrating factor in the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina economic and political area, 
and play its standard, textbook role in 
the interests of its citizens and entities? 
Due to the war and Dayton, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina today does not even 
constitute a customs union. The process 
of disintegration in former Yugoslavia 
has led to the creation of independent 
states with their own economies, and 
naturally, their own policies on economic 
relations with others. Except for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, which has relations 
with the neighbourhood’s countries under 
the Dayton Accord so anomalous that it 
does not have a unified customs system. 
The country finds itself in the awkward 
position of having, yet not having a pol-
icy for economic relations with other 
countries. Until recently, its entities 
would cooperate with neighbouring coun-
tries on free trade-zone principles. With-
out customs or other trade obstacles 
with neighbours and with regulatory ob-
stacles to trade between the entities until 
June 1998, it was natural that trade de-
veloped instead between the entities and 
their neighbours: between the Republika 
Srpska and Yugoslavia, and the Federa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Croatia. Apart from the effects of Day-
ton, there were rational reasons for this 
diversion in the post-war period. Devas-
tated by the war, Republika Srpska and 
the Federation had import needs that 
Croatia and Yugoslavia were able to 
meet. 
Leaving aside the albeit weighty po-
litical considerations, the next question is 
whether inter-entity trade determines the 
economic flows in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, or whether inter-entity trade is de-
termined by the condition of the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina economy, the Dayton 
Accord, and the neo-liberal economic de-
velopment strategy prescribed by the in-
ternational financial institutions and sup-
ported by the OHR. Bosnia and Herze-
govina is far less developed than the 
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economies of the neighbouring countries. 
In addition, special relations enable sim-
ple imports of goods from these coun-
tries, so that no rational en-
trepreneur has any good rea-
son to pursue inter-entity 
trade. The trade-diversion ef-
fect suppresses the trade-
creation effect. 
The neo-liberal concept 
of development of the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina economy 
eliminates state intervention, 
the infant-industry argument, 
and conscious foreign-trade 
policy. Meanwhile convertibility 
and a liberal foreign-trade 
sector (with underdeveloped 
domestic production) tempts a 
rational entrepreneur to im-
port products from third 
countries, thus increasing the 
balance of payments deficit of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and its entities alike. 
The question is how long this can be 
tolerated without support from the inter-
national community. What are the pros-
pects for inter-entity trade like without 
imports from third countries? 
These questions lead to the main 
thesis of this paper. Bosnia and Herzego-
vina must have economic borders, but 
only if the necessary precondition is 
achieved, in the form of dynamic eco-
nomic development, which cannot be 
guaranteed by the current development 
concept. 
3) BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: 
TRANSITION AND ITS EFFECTS, 
1996–2003 
War, Dayton, the Washington Consensus, 
the acts of domestic politicians, and the 
lack of institutions have transformed 
Bosnia and Herzegovina from a republic 
of former Yugoslavia into an independ-
ent state (or semi-protectorate) with a 
new economic system of wild capitalism  
4) BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: 
PROCESS AND PROSPECTS UP TO 
2007 
Over the course of the nine years since 
1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina has made 
some visible progress. Most importantly, 
the country is free of warfare, mainly 
due to the presence of SFOR troops and 
the international community, and in part 
due to the reconciliation process among 
the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Some progress has also been achieved in 
economic terms. GDP growth rates were 
relatively high at the beginning of the 
economic recovery process. However, the 
rate decreased to 5.8 per cent in 2002 
and fell still more to 3.5 per cent in 
2003. The poverty rate is one of the 
highest in the South-East European re-
gion. 
Economic growth is highly unbal-
anced. Per capita GDP in Republika 
Srpska is about 75 per cent of what it 
Table 8
Causes and effects 
 
War and the Washington 
Consensus An independent state 
Dysfunction 
A semi-protectorate (Republika 
Srpska; the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina with 10 cantons 
and the Brcko district) 
Dayton and the Washington 
Consensus 
A ‘wild’ Latin American type of 
capitalism on an ethnic basis 
Washington Consensus A rich few and a poor majority; total insecurity 
War and Dayton Ethnic democracy 
Washington Consensus Predatory capitalism 
War and Dayton Multinational state (Dayton ‘leopard skin’) 
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is in the Federation of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina. Foreign aid, transfers from 
abroad, and foreigners’ spending in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina represent about 30 
per cent of GDP.12 Porter’s ‘Diamond’ of 
competitive advantage has yet to be cre-
ated. The Strategy for economic devel-
opment of Bosnia and Herzegovina13 has 
underlined a few sectors as potential 
sources of comparative advantage: wood, 
textiles, footwear and metallurgy. The 
first three industries have low value-
added content and the last faces high 
international competition. The living stan-
dard, as a main element in the develop-
ment diamond, is improving too slowly 
compared with people’s expectations and 
needs. Development is unsustainable 
without fresh inflows of FDI and foreign 
aid. The strategy calls for a $3.5 billion 
financial injection to achieve a GDP 
growth rate of 5.5 per cent in the next 
three years. This amount of capital is 
hardly attainable now that privatization 
has failed, without selling the most pre-
cious domestic resources. Thus he devel-
opment process is not equitable. Overall 
it seems that the country badly needs to 
devise a better economic paradigm, and 
a more efficient political organization as 
it moves towards the EU and a brighter 
future. The strategy (known as the 
PRSP)14 is the first strategic paper pre-
pared and accepted by international fi-
nancial institutions and the government 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its main aim 
is to reach 70 per cent of 1991 GDP by 
2007 and restore partial international 
creditworthiness. This calls for swift re-
form (accelerating privatization, creating 
needful institutions, upgrading political 
stability and social capital, reintegrating 
the economic space, and gathering $3.5 
billion of FDI and aid donations. 
Turning to recent trends as ex-
pressed in the document, GDP in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina had fallen to about 20 
                                                 
12 Strategy… (2004). 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
per cent of its pre-war level, but since 
1995, there have been levels of growth 
averaging over 25 per cent per year. As 
a result, per capita GDP more than 
doubled from about KM 900 in late 
1995 to about KM 2900 in 2003, al-
though it needs to be emphasized that 
the latter level is still only about half the 
level achieved in 1990. Apart from the 
difference between the two entities, just 
mentioned, there are substantial regional 
variations as well. 
The fall in the real growth rate 
from very high levels (over 75 per cent 
in 1996 and 35 per cent in 1997) to 
about 10 per cent in 1999 and 3.5 per 
cent in 2003 reflects several factors. One 
was an immediate post-war economic 
rebound, as donor funds flowed in, fol-
lowed by falling levels of international 
assistance, slower than anticipated pro-
gress with economic reforms, political 
instability in the region, economic crisis 
in the world, and adverse climatic condi-
tions in 2000 and 2003 affecting agri-
cultural output. 
Still, some progress has been 
achieved. The central bank was strength-
ened in 2003, so that reserves covered 
about five months of imports. Growth in 
public revenues brought consolidated fis-
cal deficits down from 9 per cent of 
GDP in 1999 to a modest surplus in 
2003. The tax system was shored up 
successfully, giving a steady growth in 
revenues. A trade deficit amounting to 
50 per cent of GDP in 1996–9 is now 
falling steadily. It was about 40 per cent 
of GDP in 2003. Exports have increased 
nine times over since the war. Better 
control of expenditure has been achieved 
through the treasury system that func-
tions at state and entity level, and is be-
ing introduced at canton and municipal 
levels as well. Fiscal consolidation has 
been undertaken through additional 
measures to demobilize soldiers; reform 
of public administration is being pre-
pared. Industrial production shows posi-
tive growth. After declines in 2001 and 
2002, it grew in 2003 by 5 per cent in 
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Republika Srpska and about 4.5 per cent 
in the Federation. 
By mid-2003, much progress had 
been made in small-scale privatization: 
77 per cent of state assets in the Fed-
eration and 47 per cent in Republika 
Srpska had been sold. Privatization of 
large-scale SOEs (with over 50 employees 
or over KM 500,000 in capital) went 
more slowly. In the Federation, 272 out 
Table 9
Macroeconomic reform scenario in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2003–7, projected figures 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Real sector      
 Nominal GDP (KM millions) 12,173 12,911 13,854 14,893 16,040 
 Change (%) 4.7 6.1 7.3 7.5 7.7 
 Real GDP (KM millions) 10,805 11,357 11,981 12,640 13,335 
 Change (%) 3.5 5.1 5.5 5.5 5.5 
 Consumer price index (period average  % change) 0.1 0.9 1.8 2.0 2.2 
Savings and investment (% of GDP)      
 Consumption 111.1 108.4 106.1 103.4 100.5 
   Public 22.5 22.3 21.2 20.1 19.1 
   Private 88.7 86.1 84.9 83.3 81.4 
 Investment 19.9 20.3 21.2 21.8 22.2 
   Public 4.5 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.0 
   Private 15.5 15.5 16.3 16.9 17.2 
 National savings 2.3 4.5 6.0 8.3 10.4 
   Public 1.8 1.5 2.5 3.2 3.4 
   Private 0.5 3.0 3.5 5.0 7.0 
 Foreign savings 17.7 15.8 15.2 13.6 11.8 
General government (% of GDP)      
 Total revenues and grants 46.7 45.8 44.7 43.5 42.5 
 Grants 3.4 3.3 2.3 1.5 1.1 
 Total expenditure 46.3 46.0 45.4 44.3 43.1 
 Current 41.9 41.1 40.5 39.4 38.1 
 Capital 4.5 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.0 
  Own-financed 0.2 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.7 
  Foreign-financed 4.2 4.3 4.1 3.8 3.3 
 Overall balance 0.4 -0.2 -0.7 -0.8 -0.6 
 Excluding grants -3.0 -3.5 -3.0 -2.4 -1.7 
 Accumulation of arrears 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 
 Financing 0.2 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.1 
 Domestic 0.0 -0.2 0.6 0.7 0.3 
 Foreign 0.1 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.8 
Total foreign assistance 5 6 4.5 3.7 2.6 
 Total foreign assistance ($ millions) 350 486 372 322 283 
Balance of payments ($ millions)      
 Current account balance (including 
 official transfers) 
 
-1,237 
 
-1,302 
 
-1,368 
 
-1,324 
 
-1,187 
 Current account balance (% of GDP) -17.7 -15.6 -15.2 -13.6 -11.3 
 Export growth (%) 34 22 13 14 15 
 Import growth (%) 22 12 5.4 6.5 6.4 
 Gross reserves 1,725 1,714 1,764 1,814 1,864 
 Months of cover for imports of goods 
 and non-factor services 
 
4.5 
 
4.5 
 
4.4 
 
4.3 
 
4.1 
 Total public debt** 2,572 4,930 4,997 5,038 5,041 
 Total public debt (% of GDP) 34.0 59.7 56.2 52.5 48.5 
 Total external debt servicing (% of 
 goods and non-factor service exports) 
 
8.6 
 
7.2 
 
7.0 
 
6.1 
 
4.4 
Memorandum item:      
 Real current public expenditure (% change) 1.3 4.9 -1.3 2.5 2.8 
* Includes disbursements of foreign loans and grants. 
** Includes external public debt, stock of expenditure arrears, debt to domestic banks, and frozen for-
eign-currency deposits. Excludes any liabilities arising out of war-damage claims. 
Sources: Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities; IMF staff estimates and projections. 
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of 411 large SOEs had been privatized 
by mid-2003, and in Republika Srpska, 
304 out of 648. So 86 per cent in the 
Federation had been wholly or partly 
privatized, and in 65 per cent, this has 
been completed. The total value of pri-
vatized state capital in the Federation 
was KM 5 billion or 37 per cent of the 
sum expected of privatization. The pro-
ceeds amounted KM to 8.8 billion, of 
which only KM 338 million was in cash 
and the rest in vouchers (KM 1.76 paid 
for each KM 1 of state asset). Despite 
international support for privatizing 
‘strategic’ SOEs, only 17 out of 56 firms 
in this class had been sold by mid-2003 
in the Federation and 4 out of 52 in 
Republika Srpska. Banks in both entities 
were privatized under separate legisla-
tion. 
The banks could not be privatized 
for vouchers, only for cash, based on 
international tenders. The share capital of 
13 banks in Republika Srpska were of-
fered for sale, 11 of them majority state-
owned. Eight were sold or merged, two 
closed and two others placed in receiver-
ship. Sale of the Doboj Bank is still un-
derway. Due to the poor situation of the 
banking sector, the total proceeds were 
only KM 7.4 million. In the Federation, 
there were separate privatization pro-
ceedings for banks in majority state 
ownership and for those in which the 
state had a minority stake. Most were 
successfully privatized and sales of the 
remainder are underway. Five banks 
were placed in receivership. Banking pri-
vatization was much more effective than 
sale of the SOEs. There has been signifi-
cant foreign investment in banking, but 
the privatization proceeds have been only 
KM 6.8 million so far. 
Privatization investment funds (PIFs) 
emerged out of the voucher-based priva-
tization scheme. Eleven have been regis-
tered so far in the Federation and have 
attracted KM 4.5 billion in vouchers. By 
the end of the public offering of shares, 
these eleven had bought KM 1.9 billion 
of state assets. In Republic Srpska, there 
are 13 PIFs, which have collected KM 1.6 
billion in vouchers. The shares in these 
investment funds are listed on the Sara-
jevo and Banja Luka stock exchanges, 
creating conditions for secondary trading. 
As in most transition countries, 
merger and acquisition-based FDI has 
been considerably greater than greenfield 
investment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
This is understandable, given the privati-
zation process undertaken. Capital in-
vestment in the form of FDI increased 
significantly in 2002, bringing the vol-
ume of FDI attracted to Bosnia and Her-
zegovina since 1996 to $848,212,000. 
The biggest sources over that period 
were Kuwait and Croatia, followed by 
Slovenia, Germany, Austria, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Netherlands, and Switzer-
land. Six of the ten largest investors 
have been banks. However, investment in 
production has been insufficient, so that 
the problem of a supply-side economy is 
more critical in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
than elsewhere. The capital inflow still 
falls far short of what is required for 
economic growth or the targets of the 
PRSP. 
There are several reasons for the 
FDI shortfall. Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
not an imminent member of the EU, 
does not have attractive natural re-
sources, has not entered the decisive 
phase of privatization, shows itself rela-
tively unstable politically, and remains an 
aid-driven economy. These features mean 
it is not attractive enough for greenfield 
investors. Above all, Bosnia and Herzego-
vina remains a country with two entities, 
so that a new company has to register 
twice to trade in the whole of it. Finally, 
privatization of telecom and power gen-
eration has been postponed on the 
grounds of strategic interest. 
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5) BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA’S 
FUTURE 
The PRSP may succeed or fail, depending 
on the inflow of foreign capital and do-
nors’ aid. A new strategy may or may 
not be devised. Social capital may or 
may not be built up again. The interna-
tional community may change its position 
on Bosnia and Herzegovina or it may 
not. The EU may suddenly decide, for 
political reasons, to contemplate the ac-
cession of Bosnia and Herzegovina or it 
may not. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a 
country whose future is hard to predict. 
There is some evidence that predic-
tions about the economy have so far 
failed, for instance those made by the 
World Bank. The GDP of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina reached $ 4796 in 2001, 
whereas the World Bank has projected a 
figure as high as US$ 6262. 
The World Bank had also predicted 
exports of $1816 million by the end of 
2000, but the level attained was only 
$1100 million. On the other hand, the 
World Bank prediction of $2863 for im-
ports by that time was short of the ac-
tual figure of $3200, which took the 
trade deficit to KM 4402 million (about 
$2100 million). 
Even harder to predict is the coun-
try’s political future. There are several 
daunting scenarios to consider. Transition 
will depend on foreign forces (the inter-
national community) and the domestic 
fabric. At present, the least influential 
factor on the country’s future is its own 
citizens, strange as it may sound. 
The new economic concept of re-
gionalization embodies threats and op-
portunities. To resolve the economic and 
political issues as far as possible, the in-
ternational community (notably the OHR) 
offered Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004 
a second best solution that might turn 
out to be best under the pertaining cir-
cumstances. The circumstances are still 
the Dayton ‘skin’, which allows only a 
limited role for the state in the economy. 
The decentralized (1+10+1) commu-
nity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as sec-
ond best solution, promotes economic 
reintegration by creating economically 
viable regions. It might be said that 
from the point of view of the process of 
Table 10
Transition to the future in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Political organization Economic system 
a) This calls for a concept of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina (a new ‘Bosnian nation’) and of the country in 
European terms. 
a) The Washington Consensus. Is there any ‘real’ 
divergence from the EU? 
b) Dayton and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multi-
national country. 
b) The PRSP depends on inflows of FDI and foreign 
aid and on a role for the state. 
c) From Dayton come ethnic cantons (ESI initiative) 
and modifications thereto. 
c) Regionalization depends on a political solution 
and economic aid. 
 d) Alternative Keynesian economic policies depend 
on globalization, international attitudes and political 
organization in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Political and economic democracy Living standards 
These are functions of both the political and the 
economic factors. 
These depend on the economic policy choices. 
Multiethnic configuration Social security 
This is a function of political organization and eco-
nomic progress. 
This depends on both economic policy and political 
vision. 
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EU accession, the best idea would be to 
have Bosnia and Herzegovina as one re-
gion. But reality suggests it would be 
politically more acceptable and still eco-
nomically viable for Bosnia and Herzego-
vina to consist of more than one region. 
In terms of economic efficiency, two re-
gions could be preferable as a solution 
to three regions, and so on. 
Regionalization of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina along the lines of the EU re-
gionalization concept is not devoid of 
risk. Look, for instance, at the ethnic 
composition of the Sarajevo macro region 
in 1991 and in 2002.15 The Serb popula-
tion is concentrated in one part of the 
region, while the Bosnian population lives 
in the other. The centre of the Sarajevo 
macro region is the city of Sarajevo, the 
wealthiest part of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina. 
If applied uncritically in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the ‘new economic geogra-
phy’, as a concept of economic develop-
ment, could exaggerate the imbalance of 
economic growth in a region, with pre-
dictable consequences. Here it is worth 
quoting from Woodward at some length, 
while adding some comments in square 
brackets: ‘The remedy proposed by do-
mestic economists and required by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
exchange for credits in 1982 was a 
harsh austerity program of domestic con-
traction and export promotion, accompa-
nied by decade long series of economic 
and political reform. While the critical 
reform was liberalization of foreign 
trade and domestic prices, the creation 
of institutions necessary to implement 
such a policy mandated a radical change 
in the locus of political power over do-
mestic and foreign currency. This was 
not the first IMF-financial effort to re-
form the Yugoslav socialist economy, but 
in all previous programs, the advice has 
been to decentralize..... The result, by the 
early 1980s when the debt crisis hit, was 
a central government with almost no au-
                                                 
15 EURED (2004). 
thority over the economy and unable to 
act without the consent of all republics. 
Decentralization has gone too far, the 
market promoters concluded. A true cen-
tral bank had to be created; authority 
over monetary aggregates, debt repay-
ment, and foreign exchange policy had 
to be reunified; barriers to the flow of 
capital and labour across republics had 
to be removed; and a state administra-
tion capable of performing the functions 
necessary to an open, market economy 
had to be restored. 
‘The resulting reform program …. 
that was adopted by parliament in 1982, 
triggered three destabilizing shocks to 
the Yugoslav system…. 
‘The first shock was the challenge 
to revise the 1974 constitution.... By 
1974, the balance of power lay with the 
republics [entities and cantons today in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina], and federal 
government had responsibility only for 
the common defence, veterans, setting 
guidelines on foreign trade-oriented in-
vestment policy [as in Bosnia and Herze-
govina] legislating standards for wage 
and labour policies in the separate re-
publics, and managing the federal fund 
for regional development, which taxed 
the wealthier northern republics for re-
distribution to the south.....  
‘Liberalization required the re-
creation of a single market over the en-
tire Yugoslav area (as in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina today), and this in turn re-
quired the reunification of monetary and 
foreign exchange policy, including ad-
ministrative apparatus necessary to such 
policy. The level of decentralization 
achieved by the mid-1970s, however, 
meant that the reform was a direct at-
tack on the economic power of the 
republican governments (on the entities 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina today).... 
Those who believed in the re-creation of 
a single market were “unitarists” as well 
as “federalists”.... By using the term 
“unitarism”, they cast the centre–republic 
fight in ethnic-cum-national terms. They 
implied that this new threat from 
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plied that this new threat from Belgrade 
was from Serbs (as with Bosnians in to-
day’s Bosnia and Herzegovina). Such ob-
fuscation always was possible because 
Belgrade was the capital of both the 
federation and the Serbian republic (as 
Sarajevo is in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
today). 
Their alternatives were the decen-
tralized status quo or confederation (a 
striking similarity with Bosnia and Her-
zegovina today and, and former Yugo-
slavia in that respect).’16 
A suitable concept for achieving 
faster growth in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
could be developmentalism. A strategy 
for economic upswing and a complemen-
tary macroeconomic policy would con-
tribute to economic prosperity provided 
it contributes to ‘real convergence’ with 
the EU. The only way to achieve this in 
the medium term through a differential 
increase in productivity, and thus com-
petitiveness: 
‘Macroeconomic policy can contrib-
ute to Bosnia and Herzegovina prosperity 
only in the short run. The nominal con-
vergence, almost attained in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, can contribute to macro-
economic stability by putting things into 
place. However, it is insufficient, virtually 
by definition. Attainment of nominal con-
vergence by all parties implies a com-
parative advantage for no one.’17 
Within such an approach to eco-
nomic growth and prosperity, the eco-
nomic paradigm termed here develop-
mentalism seems the best suited to at-
taining the goals desired. 
‘Developmentalism is an economic 
system that takes a system of private 
property rights and a market economy 
as its basic framework, but that makes 
its main objectives the achievement of 
industrialization (or continuous growth of 
per capita product) and, insofar as it is 
                                                 
16 Woodward (2000). 
17 Pitelis (2000). 
useful in achieving this objective, ap-
proves government intervention in the 
market from long-run perspectives. De-
velopmentalism is a political-economic 
system established with the state as its 
unit.’18 
Developmentalism consists of market 
competition, a government-implemented 
industrial policy, export oriented manu-
facturing industries, development of 
SMEs, a search for a new mass class 
with importance attached to equitable 
income distribution and domestic centred 
demand, particular importance for com-
prehensive education, and creation of a 
fair and competent modern bureaucracy. 
There is a need and an opportunity 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina to design and 
implement industrial policy, which re-
quires a developed network of institu-
tions, including chambers of commerce, 
ministries, scientific institutes and special-
ized agencies. It should be oriented pri-
marily, and as rapidly as possible, to-
wards economic recovery higher em-
ployment. Without hampering emerging 
competitive markets, every effort must be 
made to enable the most easily activated 
sectors to begin contributing quickly to 
GNP, especially ones with a significant 
domestic-resource content, such as civil 
engineering. The main areas of imple-
mentation of should be: 
* Increasing the basic competitiveness of 
the economy by improving technologi-
cal capabilities. 
* Export promotion and development 
strategies that involve setting up in-
formation-gathering and export-
promoting institutions as well as reviv-
ing and overhauling specialized gov-
ernment-controlled export-import 
banks. 
* Export promotion involving direct help 
to firms, especially SMEs, to develop 
export strategies and reach and gain 
new markets. 
                                                 
18 Murakami (1996). 
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* Promoting R and D, particularly tech-
nological development and transfers, 
to reverse the negative trend that has 
persisted for over a decade. 
* Increasing the efficiency of technology 
transfers from abroad. 
The main components of such an 
industrial policy could be designation of 
priority industries, industry-specific in-
dicative planning and regulation of ex-
cessive price competition. Supplementary, 
but necessary policies would be protec-
tion for infant domestic industry, and a 
policy of subsidies.  
Developmentalism needs to be sup-
ported by efficient state involvement in 
the economy, which is a particular prob-
lem for Bosnia and Herzegovina, in view 
of its constitutional structure. 
6) A SWOT ANALYSIS OF SOCI-
ETY AND THE ECONOMY IN BOS-
NIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
A short SWOT analysis of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina may serve to summarize this 
paper. 
Strengths 
The Washington Consensus has contrib-
uted to stability of nominal indicators: 
prices, exchange rate and currency are 
stable, although the liquidity position is 
deteriorating. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
has gained strength in terms of nominal 
indicators. 
Weaknesses 
Of the many weaknesses since the transi-
tion began, the most relevant to the 
country’s economic prosperity of the 
country are these: 
* Political instability remains. 
* The economic space is still divided 
along entity lines. 
* The market institutions are inappro-
priate for the country’s stage of de-
velopment. 
* The state is weak and bureaucracy 
inefficient. 
* There is a dangerous level of corrup-
tion. 
* Development institutions lacking in-
clude a development fund, an export–
import bank etc. 
* The legal system is inefficient and 
poorly organized for the transition 
process. 
* The country is aid dependent. 
* The social capital is still weak. It is 
hardly possible to reach political con-
sensus among ethnically driven politi-
cal parties . Bosnia and Herzegovina 
has changed from the ‘leopard skin’ 
of the pre-war, pre-1992 period has 
turned into a ‘Dayton skin’, in which 
Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs live side 
by side in separate areas of the coun-
try. Adamant effort are needed to get 
Bosnians of all three ethnic groups on 
the same track. The author believes 
that rapid, sustainable economic de-
velopment is the main prerequisite for 
rebuilding social capital. Such eco-
nomic growth is just what has been 
lacking since Dayton. 
Opportunities 
The most promising opportunities may 
result from changes in the following 
weaknesses: 
* Political instability needs to be over-
come. 
* Market institutions have to be wisely 
built. 
* The state must be allowed to intervene 
more extensively and efficaciously in 
the economy. 
* A new strategy of growth stimulation 
is required to create jobs and expand 
human capital. 
* Corruption must be sharply curtailed. 
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* The legal system should be improved. 
The opportunities are in the hands 
of the inhabitants and the international 
community. They depend on human capi-
tal and a concept of society supported 
by political forces at home and abroad. 
Threats 
More dangerous still than the many 
transition-related threats are those arising 
out of Dayton solutions and the accord’s 
implementation of constitutional changes. 
Another threat of no less importance 
comes from globalization and the posi-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina in that 
process. In some ways resembling the 
‘good old days’ of the gold standard, 
the globalization process significantly 
erodes the ability of an independent 
country, particularly one that is less de-
veloped, to manage its own economic 
development, which is subordinated to 
the rules of globalization. The difficulty 
is compounded if the country is aid 
driven. The new concept for development 
that Bosnia and Herzegovina needs so 
badly, depends on understanding the 
process of globalization, the actions of 
transnationals, and the motives of leading 
countries. 
 
* * * * * 
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STATISTICAL APPENDICES 
Hungary Data Profile 
Click on the indicator to view a definition 1998 2001 2002 
People 
   
Population, total  10.1 million 10.2 million 10.2 million 
Population growth (annual %)  -0.4 1.6 -0.3 
National poverty rate (% of population)  .. .. .. 
Life expectancy (years)  70.5 72.2 72.3 
Fertility rate (births per woman)  1.3 .. 1.3 
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) .. .. 8.0 
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 children) .. .. 9.0 
Child malnutrition, weight for age (% of under 5)  .. .. .. 
Child immunization, measles (% of under 12 months)  99.0 99.0 99.0 
Prevalence of HIV (female, % ages 15–24)  .. 0.0 .. 
Literacy total (% of ages 15 and above) 99.3 99.3 99.4 
Literacy female (% of ages 15 and above) 99.1 99.2 99.2 
Primary completion rate, total (% age group) .. .. .. 
Primary completion rate, female (% age group) .. .. .. 
Net primary enrolment (% relevant age group) 89.5 .. .. 
Net secondary enrolment (% relevant age group) 84.7 .. .. 
Environment 
Surface area (sq. km) 93,030.0 93,030.0 93,030.0 
Forests (1,000 sq. km) .. .. .. 
Deforestation (average annual % 1990-2000)  .. .. .. 
Freshwater resources per capita (cubic meters) .. .. 11,812.2 
CO2 emissions (metric tonnes per capita) 5.7 .. .. 
Access to improved water source (% of total population) .. .. .. 
Access to improved sanitation (% of urban population) .. .. .. 
Energy use per capita (kg of oil equivalent) 2,502.9 2,487.5 .. 
Electricity use per capita (kWh) 2,864.5 2,998.2 .. 
Economy 
   
GNI, Atlas method (current US$) 45.3 billion 49.1 billion 53.7 billion 
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 4,480.0 4,820.0 5,290.0 
GDP (current $) 47.0 billion 51.8 billion 65.8 billion 
GDP growth (annual %) 4.9 3.8 3.3 
GDP implicit price deflator (annual % growth) 12.6 8.6 10.7 
Value added in agriculture (% of GDP) 5.7 4.3 4.3 
Value added in industry (% of GDP) 23.4 31.2 31.2 
Value added in services (% of GDP) 70.9 64.5 64.5 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 62.6 74.4 64.5 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 64.1 75.9 66.7 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 28.9 27.1 24.0 
Current revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP) 37.9 37.1 .. 
Overall budget balance, including grants (% of GDP) -6.5 -3.8 .. 
Technology and infrastructure 
   
Fixed lines and mobile telephones (per 1,000 people)  440.9 873.3 1,037.2 
Telephone average cost of local call (US$ per three minutes) 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people) 64.8 95.3 108.4 
Internet users 400.0 thousand 1.5 million 1.6 million 
Paved roads (% of total)  43.4 43.7 .. 
Aircraft departures 27,500.0 31,800.0 33,300.0 
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Hungary Data Profile 
Click on the indicator to view a definition 1998 2001 2002 
Trade and finance 
   
Trade in goods as a share of GDP (%) 103.5 123.8 109.3 
Trade in goods as a share of goods GDP (%) 214.8 .. .. 
High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports)  20.6 24.1 24.8 
Net barter terms of trade (1995 = 100)  100.2 95.7 96.1 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows in reporting country 
(current US$) 
2.1 billion 2.6 billion 854.0 million
Present value of debt (current US$) .. .. 32.8 billion 
Total debt service (% of exports of goods and services) 23.6 34.4 33.9 
Short-term debt outstanding (current US$) 4.8 billion 4.6 billion 5.7 billion 
Aid per capita (current US$) 23.8 41.0 46.4 
Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2004 
 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Data Profile 
Click on the indicator to view a definition 1998 2001 2002 
People    
Population, total  3.8 million 4.1 million 4.1 million 
Population growth (annual %)  3.0 2.0 1.3 
National poverty rate (% of population)  .. .. 19.5 
Life expectancy (years)  .. .. 73.9 
Fertility rate (births per woman)  .. .. 1.3 
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) .. .. 15.0 
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 children) .. .. 18.0 
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total) .. .. .. 
Child malnutrition, weight for age (% of under 5)  .. .. .. 
Child immunization, measles (% of under 12 months)  84.0 92.0 89.0 
Literacy total (% of ages 15 and above) .. .. .. 
Literacy female (% of ages 15 and above) .. .. .. 
Primary completion rate, total (% age group) .. 76.6 76.7 
Environment 
Surface area (sq. km) 51,200.0 51,200.0 51,200.0 
Forests (1,000 sq. km) .. .. .. 
Deforestation (average annual % 1990-2000)  .. .. .. 
Freshwater resources per capita (cubic meters) .. .. 9,119.6 
CO2 emissions (metric tonnes per capita) 4.4 .. .. 
Energy use per capita (kg of oil equivalent) 971.0 1,074.4 .. 
Electricity use per capita (kWh) 1,526.2 1,444.4 .. 
Economy    
GNI, Atlas method (current US$) 4.5 billion 5.2 billion 5.4 billion 
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 1,190.0 1,280.0 1,310.0 
GDP (current $) 4.3 billion 5.0 billion 5.6 billion 
GDP growth (annual %) 15.6 4.5 3.9 
GDP implicit price deflator (annual % growth) 6.9 9.1 2.1 
Value added in agriculture (% of GDP) 18.5 13.3 17.9 
Value added in industry (% of GDP) 32.3 28.4 37.2 
Value added in services (% of GDP) 49.2 58.3 44.9 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 29.3 26.0 26.2 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 66.1 57.9 59.2 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 35.9 19.4 19.6 
Technology and infrastructure    
Fixed lines and mobile telephones (per 1,000 people)  97.5 340.1 432.9 
Telephone average cost of local call (US$ per three minutes) 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Internet users 5,000.0 100,000.0 100,000.0 
Paved roads (% of total)  52.3 .. .. 
Aircraft departures 1,100.0 4,500.0 4,400.0 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina Data Profile 
Click on the indicator to view a definition 1998 2001 2002 
Trade and finance    
Trade in goods as a share of GDP (%) 74.8 86.3 78.1 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows in reporting country 
(current US$) 
66.7 million 125.4 million 293.4 million
Present value of debt (current US$) .. .. 1.8 billion 
Total debt service (% of exports of goods and services) .. 12.6 6.9 
Short-term debt outstanding (current US$) 118.5 million 59.7 million 72.7 million
Aid per capita (current US$) 240.4 157.5 142.8 
Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2004 
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